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Gale Warnings: Fragments of Charts 
and Guides for Navigators
By Reginald Ilerbold Green
The deepening  crisis o f  the ‘e igh ties is fo re ca s t in a series o f  
recent reports, revisited, review ed a n d  revalued hy R eg ina ld  
H erhold  Green in this essay covering m any o f  the  issues to he 
raised at the 1980 Special Session  o f  the  U nited N ations  
G eneral A ssem b ly  /la v in g  d iscussed , inter alia, the W orld  
D evelopm ent R eports o f  the W orld Rani., O E C D 's In ter­
fu tu res  report a nd  IL O 's  Towards Solidarity Contrac ts ,  
Green m akes a deta iled  assessm en t o f  the Brandt C o m m is­
s io n 's  report A Programme for Survival,  l ie  concludes tha t 
the Brandt report con ta ins the  only 'un ified  proposa ls fo r  
next steps a nd  interim  directions b a sed  on a politica l analysis  
o f  political econom ic  necessity  a nd  possib ility '. R eg ina ld  
U erbold  Green is now a P rofessorial Fellow  at the Institu te  o f  
D evelopm ent S tu d ies at Sussex  U niversity. H e has a long  
experience as econom ic adviser to  a num ber o f  Third W orld  
countries a nd  a d istingu ished  record  as a university  p ro fesso r  
a nd  researcher.
In ternaiional solidarity  must stem  both  from strong m utual in terests  in coopera tion  am ! from 
com passion  for the hungry.
Willy Brandt, C ha irm an 's  In troduction , N orth -Sou th : A P rogram m e fo r  Survival
The main objective must be to p reserve  the m echanism s o f the m arket econom y by cushioning 
excessively  ab rup t consequences that might give rise to  governm ental m easures w hich je o p a rd ­
ise those m echanism s.
In terfu tures f  inal R eport. Facing the Future
The analysis highlights the crucial role o f developm ent stra teg ies and policies in creating 
p roductive em ploym ent and alleviating poverty  in developing  coun tries. But it also show s that 
for these policies to yield the ir full po ten tia l, support from  a liberal in ternational environm ent is 
essen tial.
W orld Bank, World D evelopm ent R eport, 1979
The search  for solutions is not an act o f benevolence but a condition  o f survival. We believe it is 
dram atically  urgent today to start taking concre te  steps.
Brandt C om m ission  R eport, N orth -Sou th : A P rogram m e fo r  Survival
Trajectory of a tempest
The world political economic system and the 
majority o f  its constituent national sys tem s en­
ter the 1980s in a state  o f  crisis. Perceptions of  
causes,  courses ,  cures vary widely— but there  
is little disagreement that there  is a crisis, that
it is the most severe since the 1930s, that it will 
not go away by itself or  b y  continuing the 
policies o f  1945-70. F u r th e rm o r e ,  th e re  is little 
disagreement that the cris is  is g lobal  — North 
and South, West a n d  E as t  a re  invo lv ed  — or 
that it goes well  b e y o n d  techn ica l  e c o n o m ic  
questions a n d  in te rac ts  with issues  o f  limits .
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participation, human values and social organi­
zation.
In re trospec t,  the present tempest can be 
traced back to the end of  the 1960s.* The col­
lapse o f  the Bretton Woods m onetary  system; 
the first steps (largely against garments) of  the 
N ew  Protectionism; the narrowing o f  global 
food and energy ‘margins'  to knife-edge bal­
ance; declining real growth rates in socialist 
industrial econom ies;  increasing problems in 
managing unemploym ent,  inflation and in­
ves tm ent  simultaneously through neo -K eynes­
ian techniques in capitalist industrial e co n o ­
mies; dependent,  unequal and often immiseriz- 
ing development or  disintegration in a majority 
of  southern econom ies and for a majority of 
southern hum an beings . . .  the objective trends 
and events were there.  Similarly, the death of 
the growth and modernization paradigm as a 
global intellectual ideology has not been sud­
den. The still-birth of  the Pearson Report 
(Partners in D evelopm ent)  was an early sign, 
but the questioning of the adequacy  and sus­
tainability o f  the old intellectual o rde r  which 
has led to a cornucopia  (or Pan d o ra ’s box) of 
approaches from Friedmania to the Khm er 
Rouge, from R edistribution  With G rowth  
(World Bank) to the I FDA D o ssier , from Li­
m its to G row th  (Club of Rome) to basic human 
needs was much broader than rejection o f  ‘de ­
velopment aid plus free trade equals progress’ 
or  even than any reassessm ent of  North-South  
or  capital-labour relations.
The first broad realization that a crisis exis t­
ed came in the early 1970s. Even in the South, 
most  earlier crit iques such as that of  Raul 
Prebisch and E C L A  sought to achieve growth, 
modernization and integration as posited in the
• This is the w isdom  o f hindsight. The au tho r m akes no 
claim  to have seen  it in exactly  this way at the tim e.
world view and were even more economistic  
(or economystic!) than northern bourgeois and 
Marxian (orthodox, e g. M. Dobb, J. Bognar; 
heretical, e.g.  A. Emmanuel;  or  ultra-ortho­
dox, e.g. Bill Warren) variants. Even then 
there was a tendency to relate the crisis either 
to OPEC  and oil price increases or to  a set of 
‘random ’ shocks including O PEC , the 
droughts of  1972-74, the death o f  the dollar 
standard on the 1971 Smithsonian operating 
table, and reaction from the parallel 1971-73 
booms in major O E C D  economies.  Further,  it 
was still widely held that the world of  1945-70 
could be re-created, that the only real s truc­
tural problems were  in the South and/or 
North-South ,  that  the crisis w ou ld— with 
some judic ious management and a bit of 
luck— vanish as rapidly as it had come. Henry 
Kissinger could say that the international eco­
nomic order  had served the world well and 
O E C D ’s M cCracken Report could call for the 
synchronized re turn to 5 per cent growth as a 
technical,  managerial task with known, appli­
cable so lu tions . '
During 1976-77, the crisis did appear  to re­
cede. Growth recovered , oil and grain prices 
stabilized, unemploym ent in the North de ­
clined, m onetary  and trade institutions and 
balances were under  less pressure.  The North 
saw the southern  challenge as cheaply  re­
pulsed (apart from continued high oil prices) 
and its own problems as s tubborn but yielding 
to treatment.* The South was not convinced 
that progress towards an international eco ­
nomic order had begun, but many o f  its states
* P erceptions varied: the UK was a stronghold  for Cas- 
sandras largely because  o f a national W eltanschauung  
posing gradual decay  o r speedy collapse as the only 
options and because  the U K  econom y con tinued  to  per­
form so badly as to  allow  little easing o f socio-political and 
sub-class tensions.
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perceived short- term  gains and/or were focus­
ing their attention on domestic  and regional 
challenges. T his ‘false d aw n ’ (or still cen tre  of 
a typhoon) disintegrated during 1978-79. In 
re trospect,  1976—77 appeared a lull and a lost 
opportunity  for starting to rethink and restruc­
ture under less crushing pressures than those 
that typify 1980.
The com m on perception of  crisis says little 
about how it will be faced or about the chances 
for positive international structural change as 
perceived from the Third World or  from the 
viewpoint o f  the exploited, excluded and op­
pressed o f  both North  and South. There  is still 
no common perception of  causes,  com m on (or 
divergent) interests,  the limits of  the possible, 
or  the freedom of  manoeuvre. Still less is there 
any common secular  ideological perception to 
replace growth and modernization. ‘W hat we 
have we hold' is at least as common a response 
as ‘Let all boats  float higher’— witness the 
savage advance  o f  the New Protectionism. 
Those who see the birth of  a new world 
o rd e r— monetaris t  or  New Left,  orthodox 
Marxist  or  bourgeois liberal, populis t or  Pla­
tonic technocra t— cannot all be right about 
what kind o f  order  it would be. They can all be 
wrong about whether there will be any clear 
outcome to violent struggles to achieve in­
herently contradic tory  trajectories of  change 
(the 1930s are a case in point). They are surely 
all gravely underestimating the hum an costs, 
the severity and duration of  the struggle, the 
likelihood of achieving a truce of  exhaustion 
ra ther than a new synthesis and o rder  of  any 
kind. A ‘program m e for survival’ may seem a 
much more modest aim and one hardly worthy 
o f  the struggle needed to achieve it. How ever,  
there is real reason  to doubt that more can be 
achieved and little reason to be confident that 
the ‘m odes t’ aim can.
More particularly  — but equally critically for
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any reflection on development o f  and in the 
So u th — it is by no means clear that the North 
(North-East or North-West) secs N orth-South  
issues as critical to the causes,  course  or  reso­
lution o f  the crisis. National,  N or th -N or th  and 
N orth -E ast-N orth -W est  is su es— plus energy 
seen in abstraction from the general develop­
ment problem atic— are ranked much higher 
on all counts by most North decision-takers 
and analysts. The danger may be that the 
North-South dialogue of  the dea f  will end not 
with a bang but with a whimper, a fading away 
into aimless chatter  to hide the N o r th ’s un­
willingness to devote  any serious a ttention to 
North-South issues until the North  is ‘on 
course ’ again. The Manila U N C T A D  was,  in
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that case, a preview o f  this form of  break­
down.*’ If N orth-South  and South issues are to 
be. tackled as central to the present crisis and 
to its resolution,  the first challenge is to have 
them perceived as such in the N o r th — to get 
attention.
Torchhearers and trum peters
The crisis has stimulated thought.  The old 
ways — at least as followed— clearly do not 
lead to acceptable  places; there is a premium, 
therefore, on holding up torches to illuminate 
new paths and sounding trum pets  to rally 
o thers  to follow them. Of to rchbearers  and 
t rumpeters  there  is no lack; unfortunately ,  not 
only do most  o f  the torches appear  to cast a 
ra ther  fitful light and the trumpets  to have 
cracks,  but more seriously the to rches  glare 
over  quite different paths and the alternative 
trumpets  add up to a blare of  discords.*
Three major categories of  study have 
emerged, each with its own family hallmarks 
(and individual idiosyncrasies),  insights and 
blindspots ,  areas of  strength and gaps of 
weakness:
1. International institutional team  studies 
oriented to technical analysis, identification 
of the possible, management o f  change.
2. Collections o f  the perceptions of  individual 
intellectuals more or less (usually less) 
integrated to form a coherent presentation 
on political economic reality, necessary  de ­
velopments ,  the organization of change.
3. Unified proposals for next steps and interim 
directions based on a political analysis of 
political economic necessity and possi­
bility.
It is not very useful to try to divide by authors: 
technocratic  intellectuals vs freewheeling in-
• The less charitable may wish to substitute ‘a fanfare of 
strum pets '.
tellectuals vs sta tesm en served by an intellec­
tual secretariat.  Som e individuals have been 
contributors in both of  the first two categories 
and, in principle,  some could have been in­
volved in all three.
The  distinction between torchbearers  and 
trumpeters  is also blurred. All major efforts 
have sought to be torchberarers  and most have 
tried to sound a rallying call as well. It is true 
that the second group are most concerned with 
intellectual exploration and the last with pro­
viding a c lear call to a coherent programme of 
action in a form that decision-takers and pub­
lics will find convincing. But the exploration is 
intended to provide navigational guides and 
the clear calls are believed to be based on at 
least fragments o f  charts  showing whence and 
to where the crisis is sweeping us.
Any selection o f  handbooks,  manifestos, 
projections and programmes for review must 
be arbitrary. 1'he criteria used here are: (a) 
potential importance intellectually, technically 
or  operationally; (b) authorship by a North- 
South ' team ' (waived in one case); (c) placing 
central importance ■ on South-South issues 
within a b roader  global political economic con­
text (semi-waived in one case); (d) viewing 
possible ways forward as involving interaction 
as well as self-reliance, accom m odation  as 
well as t ransformation, negotiation as well as 
confrontation; (e) known to the author!
In the first category, the selections are the 
World Bank 's  1978 and 1978 W orld D evelop­
m ent R eports  and O E C D  Interfutures T eam ’s 
Final Report on Facing the F u tu re . In the sec­
ond, Albert T ev o ed jre ’s sym posium Towards 
Solidarity C on tra c ts , the Rothko Chapel 
Colloquium Tow ard a N ew  S tra teg y  fo r  D e­
velopm ent and the Centre for Research  on 
N IE O 's  C om m odities, F inance a nd  Trade 
have been picked from a rather large field of 
contenders .  The Brandt Report N orth-South:
marily North rooted intellectually ■ (even 
though the W D R s  are looking at development 
‘down there '  in the South and are  written by 
North-South teams of  individuals). Both are 
semi-official presentations o f  m ajor North- 
based multinational institutions. Both are ‘civil 
service intellectual'  docum ents  oriented  to the 
world views o f  the inst itutions under  whose 
auspices they appear,  not 'p u re '  independent 
intellectual analyses.*
More analytically,
1. Each report  is marked by an economistic  
core: production and exchange, as well as 
growth and efficiency therein , are central.
2. Each is qualified by certain social concerns,  
especially to the extent that these  are per­
ceived as critical to the stability and growth 
o f  the productive  core.
* This is not necessarily  a critic ism : freew heeling analysis 
supposedly to  be applied but with no clue as to  what 
institu tion , s ta te , class o r ideology m ,:ht choose to 
im plem ent it o r why is at best ra ther puzz¡ ig to  the reader 
and at w orst self-indulgence on the p an  o f the author.
A P rogram m e fa r  Survival is the sole repre­
sentative of  the third category because  it is the 
only serious candidate .*  That is not to demean 
it; had there been a wider field, the Brandt 
Report would have remained among the 
chosen. It is to underline that so far as sys­
tematic stra tegic proposals and initial pack­
ages proposed by North-South teams of 
sta tesmen go, A P rogram m e fo r  Surv iva l is 
‘the only game in to w n ’ with all that it implies 
about the costs o f  refusing to play, seeking to 
upset the table, or proposing the substi tution 
o f  one 's  own (marked) pack of  cards.
Plato and M achiavelli: the lim its o f technicism  
and technocrats
At first glance, the World B ank 's  W orld D e­
velopm ent R ep o rts  and In tcrfu tures’ Facing  
the F uture  appear  very similar. Both are pri­
* The 1979 A rusha Program m e o f the 77 for U N C T A D  V 
is not a cand idate  solely because a purely sou thern  analy­
sis and call to  ac tion  is, ob jectively, m ost unlikely to 
provide a viable rallying call in the N orth.
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3. Each places the (capitalist) market at the 
heart of  the economic process.
4. But each qualifies that comm itm ent,  e spec­
ially with respect to distribution o f  income 
and services, because the m arke t  m echa­
nism is seen as subject to certain inequities 
and inefficiencies w hich— if unchecked 
— can undermine its viability.
5. Each has a central Platonic organizing 
principle: intellectual technocra ts  see most 
clearly and make the best  Guardians.
6. Each is qualified by an uneasy  resignation 
to the fact that participation by political 
decision-takers (and T N C  m anagers one 
might suppose,  but perhaps they are seen as 
fellow intellectual technocrats?)  is necessa­
ry to m ake  the technocra ts '  proposals  hap­
pen and an even more uneasy acceptance 
that at least the appearance of  participation 
by workers ,  peasants ,  urban poor and hold­
ers of  a lternative  values is som etim es criti­
cal to efficiency in production and to sys­
temic stability.
7. Each brings together quite  remarkable 
quanti t ies of  data ,  an array o f  insights at 
various levels and a phalanx of  proposals to 
some extent  flowing from analysis o f  the 
data  by use o f  the insights.
8. But each leaves an uneasy feeling that the 
whole is som ehow very much less than the 
sum of its parts .
There  are, however,  more than marginal di­
vergences Interfutures had produced a coher­
ent capitalis t manifesto for our  times. It has 
written an intelligent conserva tive’s guide to 
reform. It is— up to a point — a political eco­
nomic docum ent looking well beyond growth 
and modernization, at least to the extent that 
the consequences  of  growth and moderniza­
tion build up constraints and backlashes which 
threaten the continued efficiency and viability 
o f  the p rocess .  Losers are to be helped, dissi­
dents are to be incorporated or  tolerated, as 
long as so doing reduces levels of  conflict and 
increases the sys tem 's  macro efficiency. It is 
in the tradition of  Adam Smith not Milton 
Friedman and o f  Harold Macmillan not Marga­
ret Thatcher.  Perhaps it is ultimately more il­
luminating to describe it as a call to global 
Fabianism, in terpreted as a series of  partial 
accomm odations to preserve order  and stabili­
ty and a series o f  partial incorporations to pre­
serve the basic power of dominant capitalist 
sub-classes.*
The manifesto rests on a ra ther careful ex­
amination of  the roots of  the present crisis,  the 
need for major changes, the necessary  condi­
tions for and the constraints on change. Its 
scenarios are designed to show the costs of  
North-South conflict,  of  radical disagreement 
on values within the North,  and of  the New 
Protectionism as a means to averting change. 
The Third World is to vanish— for the benefit  
of  all — by incorporating the NICs in OEC D , 
and OPEC  in N ICery  and world monetary 
management;  by giving would-be NICs and 
major raw material exporters a way forward 
through processing and manufacturing before 
export;  by aid for the very poor (states and 
people) and mixed approaches with respect to 
China and India. This is differentiation and 
divis ion— and is so perceived — but along 
lines of  selective, partial incorporation.
Ultimately, Facing the F uture  has three 
limitations;
1. While it includes many of  the e lements of  
the Charte r  o f  the Economic Rights and 
Duties o f  States and of the Arusha  Prog- 
* M ost Fabians w ould recoil at this definition. Yet how 
else can the results o f Fabianism  in the U K , the conserva­
tive social dem ocracy  o f Federal G erm any , the New Deal 
and its children in the USA  be described? F or that m atter, 
since Fabius N uncia to r won R om e's  w ar w ith C arthage by 
giving up ground time after time and losing battle  after 
battle , it is a lso  true to  the philological origins o f the term!
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ramme of  the 77 and does use a mutual 
interest f ram ework, its real concerns are 
mutating the present crisis into a reborn 
Bretton W oods world and keeping ultimate 
power in the hands of the dominant deci- 
sion-takcrs o f  the Big Three (USA, F.EC 
and Japan).
2. Its national (North  or South) domestic  poli­
cy implications are similar: they are fairly 
radical reformist and would, if acted upon, 
offer real gains to many of  the excluded, 
exploited and oppressed , but wathout really 
altering the system so that they could no 
longer be excluded, exploited or  oppressed.
3. The call to batt le does not ring clear: Inter­
futures has not made a case behind which 
key O E C D  polity and econom y deci­
sion-takers will rally. If it is to be a basic 
book for neo-capitalism, then it is as an 
analogue to D as K apita l and somebody 
must  write the N eo-C apita list M a n ife s to , in 
terms less abrasive  than the slogan that this 
author is tem pted to coin for it: ‘Privileged 
of the world unite! You have everything to 
lose unless you reforge the ch a in s— and 
pad them to avoid chafing.’
The World B ank’s efforts, at first glance, look 
much more sweepingly market-centred  and 
anti-interventionis t than F acing the F uture. 
But they al ->o appear  to be more centrally  con­
cerned with people as human beings and with 
absolute  poverty  as both an economic and a 
moral obs enity. Further,  political economy 
and struggle are notable by their absence  (ex­
cept in the industrial econom y adjustment 
exercises advocated  to help halt the New Pro­
tectionism), causing considerable damage to 
the reader 's  ability to understand who decides 
.to do various things inimical to both growth 
of  G D P and reduction o f  absolute  poverty  
and why.
Predictably, the B ank’s da ta  and insights on 
the Third World are both more varied and 
more central to its work than those of  In ter­
futures. Less predic tably, its analysis of 
1945-70 is much weaker  and less convincingly 
argued.* While the W DRs are perhaps also 
best  seen as Fabian manifestos, they seem to 
have w arm er hearts and fuzzier heads: the 
abolition o f  absolute poverty and the improv­
ing of access (achieving equality o f  oppor­
tunity) for middle-income econom ies are c en ­
tral objectives within the W D R  world view, 
but the technical analysis and especially the 
policy proposals often (by no means always) 
seem singularly inapposite.
These are basic tens ions— or con trad ic­
t ions— in the World B ank’s overall outlook 
and work, not just  in the W D Rs. U nder  Presi­
dent Robert M cN am ara ,  the Bank has becom e 
committed to meeting basic and in termediate 
human material needs effectively through the 
market.  This approach  poses at least four 
c lusters of  tensions which are as yet neither 
resolved nor adequately recognized:
1. The Bank does not unders tand  the basic 
mechanics of  socialist (especially transit ion 
to socialism ‘rigged m arke t’) sys tem s,  so 
that while not necessarily  unsym pathe t ic  in 
principle it is frequently  unsound  in p ropo­
sal and prescription.
2. Efficiency is used as a self-defining noun or 
else as an adjective related to m arket,  not 
as an adjective related to the needs that the 
market is supposed  to be meeting— a most 
eccentric borrowing from the Friedman, 
Hayek, van Mises cluster which it o ther­
wise rejects.
3. As a result,  there  is a tendency  to treat 
redis tr ibution as a consum ption— or at best 
a public service — transfer problem and not
* The W orld Bank has o ver ihree decades o f institutional 
m em ory; Im erfu tu res was a new  'one-ofT  team .
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as a question o f  restructuring opportunities 
for productive  employment up anti for gross 
exploitation down (R edistribution  With 
G rowth  remains outside the m ainstream of 
operational Bank thought and action).
4. Analysis o f  regional, class , sub-class and 
interest group is singularly absent  or  reti­
cent a n d — on the face of  it — near total m u­
tuality of  interests is assum ed, making pro­
gress purely a m atter  o f  providing correct 
technocratic  advice and educating  deci- 
sion-takers to see what is in their own inter­
ests.  That is surely too simple. Struggle is 
real; the arrival at bargained com prom ises 
or  syn theses requires knowing divergences 
as well as overlaps o f  interest and through 
w hat p rocesses  a viable interim solution (or 
resolution) may be achievable.
The W D Rs u ltimately  appear to be exercises in 
technocratic  Platonic Guardianship suffering 
both from an absence  of  political economic 
realism and a deep  fear of  broad participation, 
w he ther  by w orkers  and peasants or by politi­
cians and patriots.  Its heart is usually in the 
right place, but its head often seems unable to 
comm unica te  with it. Facing the F uture  is a 
modern guide for sta tesmen in the tradition of 
Machiavelli’s The Prince.*  Its heart is gov­
erned by its head to the point that one must 
suspect it has no independent exis tence ,  even 
if many o f  its beats are benign. But, like 
Machiavelli, Interfutures has been unable to 
locate a prince to advise; the Trilateral C om ­
mission five years ago would have seemed its 
logical court ,  but in power Trilateralists have
* This is not denigration: the M achiavelli o f The Prince 
and The Law s  is not the conniving ‘M achiavellian ' of 
popular dem onology; C hao en Lai and A ntonio Delfim 
N eto (o therw ise very different) have m ore claim  to being 
in the trad ition  o f long-term , influential, structurally  
oriented adv isers to  ru lers  he sough; (unsuccessfu lly) to 
found than , say , H enry  K issinger o r C harles N'jonjo.
been as unable or  unwilling to act on their 
previously expressed  world view and convic­
tions as Cesare  Borgia was to act on his (or 
Machiavelli's) vision of a united, self-reliant 
Italy.
G leaners and visionaries
Surveying collections of  contr ibutions by in­
dividual intellectuals even on a clear ‘set top ic ’ 
poses daunting problems. W hatever their d e ­
fects, docum ents  like the W DRs and Facing  
the F uture  usually have a certain agreement on 
definitions and terminology, a more or less 
coheren t  and consistent (even if often flawed, 
incomplete or internally contradictory) world 
view, and a degree of  unity of  analysis and 
prescription. That can almost never be said of  
team elTorts comprising individual essays on 
varying aspects of  a com m on theme. Such ef­
fo r t s— at their best — pose alternatives and 
contradic t ions more sharply and offer a wider 
a rray  of  insights, but this only adds to the 
difficulty of  seeing them as a whole or  sum ­
marizing them succinctly without gross in­
accuracy  or  favouritism.
Towards Solidarity  C ontracts  i llustrates the 
strengths and w eaknesses of  the genre. A cruel 
critic could assert  that the contributors  are 
simply not talking about the same thing. 
Self-interest is treated by some as the anti­
thesis o f  solidarity, by others as an element 
within it (perhaps its foundation) but by no 
means the whole o f  solidarity,  while for yet 
others overlapping self-interest in reducing the 
costs of social conflict is solidarity. A radical 
critic might suspect that 'solidarity ' was likely 
to prove a mystification in theory (to hide the 
reality of  contradic tions) and a demobilizing 
force in practice (to prevent the prosecution of 
struggle). A Friedmanite would challenge the 
mixing of fairness and justice with economics 
and efficiency, asserting that such illegitimate
combinations were bad economic science, 
worse political practice and abominable  ethics.  
Both the radical and the Friedmanite could cite 
chap ter  and verse (sometimes the same verses 
in the same chapters)  in support of  their con­
tentions.  If one reads Towards Solidarity  Con­
tracts  as a precise theoretical treatise or  as a 
systematic set o f  organizing guidelines for in­
ternational political economic relations, then 
all three lines of  criticism are fully just ified.
How ever ,  that is not the only way to use the 
volume. The attempt to define a concept of 
reciprocal and enforceable re lationships 
b roader  than narrowly defined joint self-inter­
est  is not a nonsense —  solidarity has num er­
ous concre te  existences and is interestingly 
explored by several contributors.  There are, or 
ap p ea r  to be, opportunities for the use of  such 
‘c o n trac ts ’ to handle some aspects of  interna­
tional political economic relations: among 
'l ike-minded ' states, classes,  organizations for 
specified objectives agreed in a context  o f  on­
going dialogue and contact;  among ‘Iike- 
goaled’ states and institutions using solidarity
in a way analogous to a trade union (e.g. 
O PEC  and the Front Line States and the Libe­
ration M ovem ents  of  Southern Africa); among 
‘common imperilled’ states and institutions 
(e.g. the global eradication o f  smallpox under 
W HO leadership and the East African Desert 
Locust Control Organization). There  is no in­
herent contradic tion between solidarity and 
struggle: as several contributors point out, 
most cases o f  solidarity involve solidarity with 
others but also against some external ‘e n em y ’ 
whether natural,  institutional,  national,  class 
or human. Tow ards Solidarity C ontrac ts  does 
provide partial insights and dem ons tra tes  the 
need to explore them further. It does show that 
there are some actual and more potential  cases 
in which solidarity contracts are a usable way 
forward and thereby challenges o thers  to 
identify possibilities, constraints,  necessary 
conditions and institutional vehicles both more 
generally and over  a wider range o f  cases.
Toward a N ew  S tra tegy  fo r  D eve lopm ent is 
a very different volume. It is self-consciously 
intellectually sophisticated often to the point
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o f  abstraction from prescription in forms of 
direct interest (or intelligibility) to decision- 
takers (or decision victims). One may wonder 
what Dom Helder  Camara,  in whose honour 
the colloquium series is held, would make of  it 
as a contribution to understanding or  advanc­
ing the human condition, especially the human 
condition o f  the excluded, exploited and op­
pressed o f  the Third World. The divers ity of 
approaches ,  indeed o f  world views, represen t­
ed was evidently stimulating and enriching for 
the colloquium participants ; but what is to be 
made o f  an u ltra-orthodox Marxist  case that 
capitalism is the progressive force o f  the last 
quarte r  of  the twentieth century ,  a reasoned 
argument that neo-classical and orthodox 
Marxist  econom ic  analysis are tending to 
merge and to produce relatively similar re­
pressive policy prescriptions,  an interpretation 
of all in ternational changes of  any significance 
as transfer paym ents  justifiable only on the 
basis of  reciprocal quid pro quo obligations 
(more or less solidarity contracts as reversed 
in a mirror)? Do these  illuminate reality? Do 
they offer any insights into how the present 
crises rnay be managed (apart perhaps from 
talking it to death ,  which seems unlikely to 
work)?
Again, this is perhaps not a comple te  or 
useful way of  looking at the volume.* Toward  
a N ew  S tra teg y  does present past strategies 
and their results  (from different points of  view) 
with considerable  clarity and t renchancy. 
However much or little it contributes  directly 
to illuminating the road ahead, the volume 
does shed a great deal of light on how we got 
where we are today. That is not a small virtue; 
only an understanding of history c rea tes  the 
possibility o f  transcending it and only the frank
* The au th o r m ust hope so , as he is one o f the con tribu­
to rs '
appraisal o f  mistakes can provide a foundation 
from which to avoid repeating them.
On a different level, the N IE O  debate (N. 
Islam, F. Mansour, R. N. Cooper,  R. H. 
Green) is illuminating in several ways. First,  it 
re traces the road to 1977 as seen from South 
and North.  Second, it lays bare the differing 
perspectives and terminologies which have 
helped to make the North-South  dialogue a 
T ow er  o f  Babel. Third, ra ther  surprisingly, it 
does reveal substantial overlaps of the agendas 
for international negotiation and action of  at 
least three o f  the contributors,  who start from 
different vantage points and have apparently  
widely divergent long-term normative objec­
tives.
The Centre  for Research on N IE O  has 
sought in a sense  to begin at and articulate  
from the point reached by the N IE O  dialogue 
ip Toward a N ew  S tra tegy  fo r  D eve lo p m en t. 
Not in the literal sense of using the particular 
papers or  participants and certainly not from 
the same ra ther  abstracted  intellectual stance, 
but in that of  a ttempting to work out a common 
language, a com m on perception of  what each 
party believes his interests to be and why, an 
agreed identification o f  areas o f  mutual, con­
gruent or  overlapping interests and initial 
thoughts about  how these interests might be 
negotiated and acted upon. C om m odities , Fi­
nance and  Trade  is the first fruit of  that quest 
as pursued in four symposia during 1978, 
spanning the final debacles of  U N C T A D  V and 
the Tokyo GATT Round. It is to be jo ined by a 
companion volume on law, which with its 
emphases on the achievement o f  structural 
changes in international law (e.g. the evolution 
of  ‘permanent  sovereignty over natural re ­
so u rces ’ to the verge of  being a basic, general 
principle), on the potential of  such concepts as 
‘unjust en r ichm ent’, and on the nature, m ean­
ing and inherent limitations o f  long-term co n ­
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tracts is in some respects likely to be more 
novel and perhaps more stimulating.
C om m odities , F inance a nd  Trade addresses 
itself squarely to seeking answers to deci- 
sion- takers’ questions. What has gone wrong? 
For  whom ? W hy? What is to be done? How 
can that be agreed? By whom ? Which inst itu­
tions and policies can implement the agreed 
actions?  At what costs and with what gains? 
For  whom ?
The answers are by no means identical; at 
present, that does not make for a happy result, 
but one flowing from a hermetic selection of 
participants unlikely to be able to com m uni­
cate with or  to influence outsiders. However,  
valid queries may be raised as to whether  the 
contr ibu tions— in the set papers or  in the dia­
logue which surrounded th em — go into 
enough depth o f  analysis. Is this a case of 
providing answ. rs before knowing the real na­
ture of  the quest ions?  If  not,  why do some 
contributions make certain policy prescrip­
tions appear  rational and beneficial for all, or 
almost  all. N orth-South  dialogue participants 
when in practice they have proved impossible 
to negotiate or in some cases have not even 
had serious support  from any quarte r?
Certainly, as finished intellectual works of  
art,  the papers in C om m odities, F inance and  
Trade will not bear comparison with those in 
Toward a N ew  S tra teg y . At one level, they do 
make the road ahead look easier to pick out 
and less o f  an uphill slog than it is. But a case 
can be made both for the level o f  presentation 
and for the concentra t ion  on demonstra ting 
that feasible, graspable opportunities for 
broadly beneficial change do exist.* Fresh,  
simple presen ta tions with a c lear action 
orientation are needed today— technocra ts  are
* Again, the au th o r m ust hope so, as he is one o f the 
contributors!
frequently in the market for potential agenda 
items. Only if the proposals are not ju s t  imper­
fect but also in the wrong direction is their 
slightly premature  and tentative floating likely 
to prove harmful. There  is little need to stress 
difficulties— pessimism o f  the intellect is per­
vasive. What is needed, and what a majority of 
the contributions in C om m odities , F inance  
a nd  Trade do offer, is a demonstra t ion  that 
optimism o f  the will is still feasible and, at least 
partially, can be related to quite  concre te  intel­
lectual, in terest  and pow'er considerations.
N orth-South:'A  Program m e fo r  Survival: can it 
be?
The Report o f  the Independent  Com miss ion on 
International Development Issues (Brandt 
Commission) requires special t rea tm en t  for 
several reasons:
1. It, alone, is a deliberate ‘balanced package '  
produced by individuals with a  broad range 
of  views.
2. The au thors  are widely respec ted  public 
figures— some not previously m uch co n ­
cerned with development i s su es— whose 
joint recom m endations  could have an im­
pact on the course  o f  negotiation and ac­
tion.
3. There  is no alternative act ion/negotia tion 
package available to the forthcoming UN 
Special Session or to any new ‘Global 
Round of  Negotia t ions’.
4. If, therefore,  A P rogram m e fo r  Surv iva l is 
basically correct in course  and con ten t ,  it 
should be backed wholeheartedly  to start 
the process and criticized in detail later 
when there is a forward dynamic to adjust 
(and if it is basically wrong, it should be 
blasted from sight before ano th e r  SIECA 
—  Paris T a lk s— disaster ensues).
The K rport f>f t h<‘ Inilopcndont 
Commission on ln to rnn tiona l 
D ovolopm cnt I ssu e s  u n d e r  th e  
C hairm ansh ip  of W illy  B ran i it
•í P rogram m e fo r  Survival a t tem pts  to face the 
present crisis head on. It states that the 1980s 
pose more dangers  than any period since 1945. 
I'he international economic order  (more ac ­
curately. New International Econom ic Dis­
order) functions so badly as to damage the 
short-term and undermine the long-term inter­
ests o f  ail nations. The crises are advanced  as a 
basic reason why joint action is critical: sur­
vival. northern emergence from recession, 
southern emergence to developm ent,  and the 
poor’s em ergence from absolute  poverty are 
presented as parts of  a whole, attainable  jo in t­
ly or not at all. The intellectual conversion that 
this represents for several members (and not 
only in the' N o r th — at least two southern 
commissioners used to say that northern re­
cession and unemployment were trivial mat­
ters) is impressive.
The Report begins (Chapter 1) by outlining a 
world political economic order  faced by in­
creasing and increasingly unmanageable crises 
over  the past decade. It relates these to multi­
ple st ructural factors at North /South ,  North,  
South and national levels.  Without structural 
changes,  it projects a steady worsening o f  the 
crises with no recovery in the North,  no de ­
velopment in the South,  no lessening of  
N orth-South  or  regional tensions.
The presentation o f  national. North and 
South internal structural change requirements 
is less detailed and ra ther less convincing than 
the global a rg u m en t— presumably because 
ICID1 is primarily addressing itself to global 
action. How ever,  the global analysis does not 
hang in a void. Chapters 2, 4 and 8 address 
themselves to development requirements  in 
the South in a way far more incisive than most 
global documents;  the need for structural 
changes in the North (as well as an acceptance 
that they have costs) appears in several places, 
especially Chapters  3, 7 and 11.
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Self-interest to bolster com passion
The Brandt Commission emphatically does not 
reject the moral case  for global change. Moral 
appeals and human concerns surface fairly 
frequently both in the general chap ters  and in 
those on the Poorest  Countries (4) and Hunger 
and Food ( “'). I'he call on self-interest as a 
lever for change is seen as an addition not a 
substi tution. Unless there are radical changes, 
there will be damage to the economic and poli­
tical positions of the powerful (in North  and 
South) and global insecurity will be increased 
(Chapters 3 and 7). This c a s e — in terms of 
immediate responses needed —  is largely 
directed at the North (including the North- 
East).  The C om miss ion 's  reading (Chapter  1) 
of  1973-79 history as one of-southern propo­
sals for negotiated change and northern pas­
sive resistance suggests that a major change of 
approach is vital if the North-South  deadlock 
is to be broken.
A P rogram m e fo r  Survival's, delineation of 
mutual interests (perhaps more accurately  
overlapping or interlocking interests)  set out in 
Chapter  3 is not naive. It recognizes that there 
are areas of  conflict,  that many clashes are 
more intra North ,  intra South or  national in 
origin than North-South ,  and that mutual 
interests arc not the same as identical inter­
ests.  It is frank in admitting that acting on 
mutual interests entails costs;  not doing so en­
tails higher ones.  ICIDI almost  accepts  that 
confrontation is at times a necessary  part of, 
and prelude to, negotiation. The implicit model 
is not an end of  ideology or paternalistic , but a 
cross between global analogues to Keynesi­
anism, robust industrial relations, radical so­
cial democracy and national liberation m ove­
ments.  This working compromise  among the 
Commissioners may be operational and is cer­
tainly intellectually stronger than the failure to
confront the limits of  mutual interest ,  the reali­
ty of struggle and the nature of political e co ­
nomic change which characterizes most  inter­
national documents.
What overlapping interests?
Mutual interest approaches need to identify 
priority mutual, overlapping an d /o r  com ple­
mentary interests.  What arc lC ID I 's  cand i­
dates?
N orth: Extrication from recession: access  to 
a constant or  slowly rising volume of  oil at 
slowly and predictably rising real price; 
greater  assurance  o f  future raw material sup­
plies; averting an international banking crisis; 
creating a less insecure and unpredictable  in­
ternational m onetary  system; averting  un­
manageable dem ands on agriculture.
South: Averting stagnation and d isintegra­
tion; securing external resources on fair terms; 
achieving greater  access  to industrial econom y 
markets ; shifting much raw material p rocess­
ing. manufacturing, international marketing to 
producing countries;  winning effective partici­
pation in global economic institutions; achiev­
ing food and energy security; achieving fairer 
contracts with and operational regularity pow­
ers over T N C s and with respect to technology.
B o th : Increasing global management ca ­
pacity; reducing instability caused by lack of  
security and/or inequitable contracts;  lowering 
the burden o f  armaments  expenditure; b reak ­
ing the circle o f  insecurity, a rmaments ,  eco ­
nomic drain, greater insecurity.
The North and South c lusters are rational, 
potentially convincing to decision-takers,  and 
related to modalities for action w hich are not 
beyond the limits o f  the credible. The security 
area  poses more problems. The need is made 
clear (Introduction and Chapter  7), the analy­
sis is not naive, the examples are mind-catch­
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ing (e.g. one tank = classrooms for 30,000). 
But the reasons why the circle continues are 
not made c lear enough for prescription and 
there is a virtual admission o f  inability to 
locate adequate  (old or  new) modalities to 
achieve a structural change on the ‘Disarma­
ment and Developm ent '  front.
A rticulating interests
The bulk of  the Report (Chapters 4-7 and 9-16) 
is a sustained articulation of  overlapping inter­
ests in key areas from developm ent finance 
through hunger and energy to population. Few 
o f  the proposals are novel,  but the methodical 
elaboration o f  the network o f  complementary  
interests across  the broad array o f  North- 
South issues is both new and potentially co n ­
vincing. Potentially only because  it requires 
that the North  believes recovery  is a good 
thing (i.e. that sustained high unemployment 
and bankruptcy  levels are neither ends in 
themselves nor necessary conditions for ex­
ternal paym ents  balance and price stability) 
and that loan-cum-export led recovery via the 
Third World is be t te r  than arm am ents  led re­
flation and more practicable than, or consis­
tent with, dom estic  social service and transfer 
led programmes. Equally, it requires that  the 
South believes that this approach can secure  
significant st ructural change, that the North 
will be willing to negotiate on its prom pt im­
plementation,  and that confrontation is unlike­
ly to produce be tte r  results given the present 
crises and political economic pow er configu­
rations.
The N 1 E O /N N E O  issue is tackled m oder­
ately squarely. The need for internal change in 
the South is not glossed over, but is set beside 
the relatively unfavourable post-war economic 
contex t  which confronts southern  politics 
seeking hum ane development (Chapter  8 is a
clear a ttack on the 1978 IV D R 's view of  the 
1945-70 setting). The Chairman argues:
Change and reform cannot take place on a one-way 
street; they must be supported by governments and 
people in both industrialized and developing coun­
tries . . .  Waste and corruption, oppression and vio­
lence, are unfortunately to be found in many parts 
of the world. The work for a new international eco­
nomic order cannot wait until these and other evils 
have been overcome. We in the South and the 
North should frankly discuss abuses of power by 
élites, the outburst of fanaticism, the misery of mil­
lions of refugees, or other violations of human rights 
which harm the cause of justice and solidarity at 
home and abroad (p. 10) . . .
but as a part of  the process o f  structural t rans­
formation, not as a precondition for beginning 
its global action aspects.
W hat is — and isn ’t — the Report?
The appearance o f  a potential major docu­
m en t— w hether  programme for action, in­
tellectual treatise,  political manifesto or 
po em — leads to varied expecta tions,  interpre­
tations,  premonitions and criticisms. Some of  
these turn on reading the docum ent as som e­
thing different from what it is.
A P rogram m e fo r  Surv iva l is the product of  
serious reflection. No document which begins 
by asserting that the S o u th ’s economic rela­
tions with the North are characterized by in­
equality and dependence and that there is a 
mutual interest in changing this can be accused 
o f  repeating accepted platitudes! Nor is ‘there 
must be an end to mass hunger and malnutri­
tion' the conventional central thrust of  a tw en­
ty-year food programme. C om pare  the 1978 
and 1979 W D Rs which accept 400-800 million 
absolutely impoverished in the year 2000 as a 
fact o f  life— or more accura te ly— of death.
But/4 P rogram m e fo r  Survival is not a  major 
analytical study, nor does it present an inlel-
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lectually novel world view. Practical political 
p rogram m es— especially those ham m ered  out 
by a coalition — never  do. They draw on what 
has been thought and analysed before. Their 
novelty lies in transferring proposals and in­
sights from the realm o f  discussion to that of 
action and in putting apparently  (or actually) 
disparate agenda items together in new ways 
to achieve a package which— as a w ho le— is 
more broadlv acceptable  than most ot its com ­
ponents . This 1CIDI has sought to do.
New Jerusalem or first steps to progress?
Any reader  expecting to find the blueprint for a 
New Jerusalem, let alone an autobahn to it, 
will be grievously disappointed. The m em bers’ 
New Jerusalems are not the same. They are 
astu te  and modest enough to doubt that they 
know their city plans or the exact  alignment of 
the roads leading to them. In any event.  New 
Jerusalem designing is appropria te  to political 
and intellectual mobilization for conflict and 
confrontation,  not for devising action prog­
ram m es for breaking deadlock and creating a 
forward dynamic among parties whose over­
lapping interests neither are nor can be total.
A P rogram m e fo r  Surviva l is a ‘brokered 
d o cu m en t’, a ‘bargained com prom ise ' .  These  
are not necessarily pejorative descriptions. 
Much the same could be said of  the US Consti­
tution or Len in’s What Is To Be D one’.
S tructural or marginal?
The  Brandt Commission stands squarely 
among the advocates  of  major structural 
change. Some of  the jux tap o s i t io n s— prosperi­
ty o f  the rich and progress o f  the poor and 
TNG’ investment flows, mineral supply and 
transfer  of  lechnology (C hapter  12)— are not 
the happiest ,  but in part this is the price of
achieving any agreement on advocacy of  major 
change. Neither the opening chapter  on c o n ­
text nor  the concluding chapter  on programme 
is marginalist.  Even the cases cited represent 
calls for change; the present northern  co n v en ­
tional wisdom docs not accept  that progress of 
the poor  South is a precondition for the p ro s­
perity of  the rich North as does 1CIDI. I he 
emphasis of  Chapter 12 on the need for fair 
con tracts  as a precondition for stable T N Cl 
host  relations is a novel view in the North.
Of course,  the Brandt Commission does not 
endorse  a u ta rch y — by South or North .  The 
nature of  its endorsem ent o f  self-reliance is 
more surprising than its limits:
The South needs and wants to be more self-reliant, 
to complete the process of political independence 
with economic independence. But that does not 
imply separation from the world economy. It means 
rather the ability to bargain on more equal terms 
with the richer countries to attain a fair return for 
what it produces, and to participate fairly in the 
control and running of international institutions (p. 
42).
Third W orld manifesto or balanced 
programme?
As a Third World manifesto the ICIDI Report 
would be a ra ther weak and flawed docum ent,  
but it is hard to imagine why anyone  would 
suppose it is, or could have been, such a mani­
festo. Only the 77 and N on-A ligned— or 
commissions chosen by and from them — can 
fulfil that role. .4 P rogram m e fo r  Surviva l nev­
er set out to be a partisan manifesto or  an 
initial bargaining position, and to criticize or 
praise it as such is to weaken its potential 
impact.
It a ttempts to argue that structural change 
in the North ,  the South and globally is e ssen­
tial from the points of  view o f  South and
50 R egina ld  H erbold  Green
North,  rich anti poor. It seeks to build on that 
base, to outline both the broad guidelines of  
necessary changes and the major initial prog­
rammes needed to reverse the trends towards 
depress ion , stagnation, disintegration and 
mass starvation,  and to create  a dynamic to­
wards positive change. These a ttem pts  can be 
successful only if the Commission is viewed as 
a non-partisan body (a highest com m on de­
nominator o f  individual partisans) and its 
emergency ‘Programme of  Priorities’ (Chap­
ter 17) as a  final, minimum, bargained agree­
ment not a m aximum initial proposal.  Confus­
ing the former with the latter is dangerous ,  as 
exemplified by the unhappy history of 
U N C T A D 's  own proposals (e.g. Com mon 
Fund, Codes o f  Conduct) ,  whose initial form 
and content have been largely those  of  an 
honest  b ro k e r ’s final resolution o f  divergent 
interests but whose image in the North  (not in 
the South) has been o f  maximum South ‘de ­
m ands’ to be ‘pared d o w n ’. If the Brandt 
Commiss ioners  are even vaguely right in their 
assessm ents ,  to treat their proposals in that 
way will be to render them totally ineffective 
for the North  as well as the South.
T he m echanics o f the argum ent
The mechanics of  A P rogram m e fo r  Survival 
are more complex and coherent than may ap­
pear at first reading. Four them es recur  regu­
larly.
First is integration (not exclusion or  frag­
mentation) by differentiation. There  is no pre­
tence that the South (or. less clearly stated,  the 
North-west) is homogenous. Separate  prog­
rammes for the poorest,  a set of  approaches to 
trade,  special a ttempts to resolve a series of 
energy and raw material uncertainties particu­
larly damaging to identifiable c lusters of  coun­
tries,  and acknowledgement of  divergent initial
domestic  development priorities arc examples 
o f  this theme. ‘Divide and rule’ is stood on its 
head — divide to provide relevant access  and 
participation is substi tuted. This may be crit i­
cal. The N o r th ’s use of ‘differentiation’ as a 
lever to pry the South apart  and the 
So u th ’s — partly consequential — tendency to 
avoid giving serious attention to differentiated 
approaches  at the negotiating level arc not 
conducive to moving towards agreed action. 
Inclusion by differentiation may offer a pass­
able road out of  that impasse.
Seco n d  is the repeated emphasis on the 
interlocking nature of  the mutual (overlapping) 
interests. Using concessional transfers or 
loans to overcom e recession/sustain develop­
ment now requires market access for pro­
cessed commodities/manufactures  if grants are 
ever to be phased out or  loans serviced. With­
out effective Third World participation, there 
can be no consensus  for the stronger interna­
tional institutional mechanisms needed to re­
duce uncertain ty  and instability.
Third, inclusion by differentiation is applied 
to the international negotiating process (Chap­
ter 16). Initiating a forward dynamic,  broad 
approval o f  principles, detailed negotiation of  
provisions and legal instruments, and am end­
ment/ratification of  the results of negotiation 
are separated. The second and fourth require 
global bodies. The third requires small,  expert  
groups with members chosen by, in touch with 
and responsible to constituencies o f  states.  
One hundred and fifty delegations simply can ­
not negotiate in detail. A dozen parallel 150 
state negotiations are not feasible for more 
than half a dozen  states because of  limits on 
personnel and knowledge. This suggests a 
workable process from general guideline-set­
ting to detailed negotiation to ratification and a 
division of  responsibili ty— especially at nego­
tiating level— among different forums, with
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the General Assembly  and E C O SO C  having 
the duty o f  taking a broad-front, strategic 
view.
Com plem entary  to this process are enhanc­
ing the operational capacity of  international 
bodies, enhancing southern participation and 
influence in them and staffing them with 
people with 'qualifications and sensitivities to 
the problems involved ' (p .217: in that context,  
a brutal crit ique of  the IMF, but in milder form 
a recurrent theme).
F o u rth , the initiating role is seen as played 
by small— often non-governmental— groups,  
such as ICID1, as often as by initial broad state 
coalition proposals.  To bolster it, and to see 
that implementation stays on course ,  a perm a­
nent external monitoring unit of  dist inguished 
persons is proposed. The immediate problem 
is restarting a negotiating process broadly seen 
as aimed at reaching agreement on change and 
its implementation:
But we believe the present deadlock is so serious, 
and the need to break through is so evident, that 
nothing should delay discussion and negotiation at 
the highes level. We hope that a summit could 
enable (a ^mall group of) leaders to take the first 
step (p.281).
The Commission is evidently influenced by its 
own evolution to perceive broad areas o f  m u­
tual interest and believes a similar exercise by, 
say, twenty heads o f  state  could catalyse  a 
process of  action-oriented,  comm on-ground 
broadening, speedy negotiation. This is, of 
course ,  a hope ra ther than a firm predic tion, 
but it is hard to discern a be tte r  option. The 
sheer size and make-up o f  the Special Session 
surely preclude its playing the role o f  initiating 
catalyst .
Em ergency program m e, 1980-85
An emergency programme o f  selected initia­
tives for 1980-85 is given special attention. 
Breaking the present deadlock and creating a 
dynamic towards exploring com m on ground 
requires early action. Falls in northern  e x ­
ports, failures among northern banks ,  energy 
anaemia and food scarcity at much more 
crippling levels than those of  1973-75 or 1979, 
broadening ou tbreaks  of  aggressive p ro tec tion­
ism, and a descent into global depress ion  if 
nothing is done to reverse p re se n t  t rends and 
perspectives are set out as the case for accep t­
ance by the North.
The five themes chosen  are: massive re ­
source  transfers;  an international energy st ra t ­
egy; a global food strategy; at least some major 
international economic system reforms (with 
the monetary/financial institutions and condi­
tions of  trade for the South in m anufactures  
plus commodities the p referred  candidates);  
and the Economic Summit to start the p rocess 
and to give an authoritative  blessing to im m e­
diate action on the balance of  the emergency 
programme.
It is in a sense ironic that A P rogram m e fo r  
S u rv iva l , like every  major global development 
manifesto since the UN efforts of  the 
mid-1940s, ends by giving a central  role to 
concessional and commercial resource  trans­
fers at increased levels on terms consis tent  
with servicing capacity .  The continuity  is 
somewhat misleading. The Commission does 
not see aid as the permanent cen tre  o f  a new 
international econom ic  order,  on the contrary.  
But in the short run it sees massive increases '  
(doubling to S40 billion in 1978 prices) o f  con­
cessional finance as vital to sustaining devel­
opment in the poorest  countries and continued 
recycling of  petro surpluses to middle-income 
countries (via partial guarantees to commercial 
banks,  some interest  subsidization and raising 
World Bank lending power to $80 billion) as 
critical to underpinning their continued growth
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in the face of  short-term external  deficit widen­
ing. For the North,  these transfers are critical 
to avert  damaging defaults and loss o f  export 
growth m omentum. Export led recovery  and 
growth in the North financed by capital  trans­
fers to accom m odate  southern external bal­
ance crises and sustain or  enhance growth and 
development is the central  1980-85 mechanism 
for realizing mutual (overlapping) interests.
The energy strategy proposed is a tta inment 
o f  predictable gradual real price increases for 
petroleum and indexation of  Financial assets of 
exporters,  supply security, enhanced  conser­
vation and research /developm ent on addi­
tional (especially renewable) energy sources. 
Food strategy focuses on food security with 
regular supplies, emergency stocks,  more pro­
duction oriented and more dependable  food 
aid, and increased production by the South as 
the main modalities.
Better access  for southern manufactured 
and com m odity  exports (especially in pro­
cessed form) is one 1980-85 target under the 
major reform cluster.  It is necessary  if the 
enhanced concessionary  transfers are to be 
limited lo 1 per cent of  northern G D P by 2000 
and trade-expanding commercial  finance is 
to be self-liquidating. The o ther  structural 
changes towards N1F20 proposed for 1980-85 
are financial. They are sketched in terms of 
effectiveness in meeting short- and long-term 
financial flow needs consistent with reducing 
threats to financial institutions (and national 
financial viability), re-creating the IM F with 
global (including North-East) participation in 
decisions and key personnel, creating the 
World Development Fund to complement the 
World and Regional Banks by Filling gaps and 
handling a large proportion o f  the additional 
concessional resource  flows.
The package appears to be a rational one for 
an initial agenda; food security, energy pre­
dictability and financial resources to avert 
deepening depression are vital to halting de­
cline and creating a forward dynamic. So are 
some structural changes towards N1EO. While 
one might have o ther candidates,  trade and 
financial institutions are areas o f  real impor­
tance. They have broadly perceived problems, 
identifiable comm on interests and good pros­
pects for visible, valuable action soon after 
agreement in principle is reached. Further,  
trade encom passes major aspects o f  industri­
alization and commodities. The case against 
extending the lis t— the codes/laws on T N C s,  
transfer of  technology and business practices 
would seem the leading candida tes— is that 
the span of  issues which one summit can agree 
upon, which one general (e.g. UN or 
ECOSOC) conference can send forward with 
guidelines to negotiate , which parallel negoti­
ations can bring to adoption and states put into 
operation is limited. A more propitious time 
for addit ions might be once the initial package 
is well along this road. In any case,  ongoing 
negotiations would not need to be halted any 
more than ongoing ECDC and T C D C  efforts 
which— because  they are South-South rather 
than global-—also fall outside the central  
North-South priority action focus.
What to do
The most critical question for the reader  with 
respect to the Brandt Report is whether  it is 
worth backing. It is the 'last best  c h an ce ’ for 
an early revival of  a meaningful North-South 
dialogue. That ,  in itself, may not be adequate  
grounds for support;  it may not win the sup­
port of  key northern governments .  That,  in 
itself, is not adequate  grounds for non-support 
and is potential ly subject to change if there is 
enough support.
Would A P rogram m e fo r  Surv iva l, if adopt­
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ed and acted upon, improve the present condi­
tions and the prospects  for the unemployed, 
the poor, the sick,  the starving? Would it pro­
vide real material gains to Third World states 
and greater room for manoeuvre to those seek­
ing to achieve New National Economic Orders 
(including transit ions to socialism)? The an­
swers must be affirmative. The degree is in 
question, not the direction.
Does the shilt from moral advocacy  to a 
mutual (overlapping) interest advocacy  linked 
to a moral affirmation vitiate the Report? Why 
should it? Moral causes have usually— not al­
w ays—  made progress when powerful inter­
ests (sub-classes) saw their advance as having 
‘something in it' for them. To quote  Com mis­
sioner Ramphal:
If in fact the North can be convinced to make the 
kind of changes in the world economy which the 
South has been seeking not on grounds of  charity or 
benevolence but of hard-headed self-interest, then I 
say it is a g a in  for the South. 1 think there are good 
moral reasons w h y  the North should do it. But if the 
North cannot be moved by morality, why should we 
hesitate to move it on grounds of  self-interest?
Will supporting the R eport’s proposals hamper 
the attempt to launch a new high level, key 
issue N orth-South  dialogue? It is difficult to 
see why. Evidently Commissioners Ramphal, 
Yaker and Jam al— all 'N ew  Global R ound’ 
advoca te s— do not think so.
Is the Brandt Report really enough to cause 
structural change or  will it leave all serious 
decision-making power in northern hands and, 
by its t ransfer payments  and terms of  bargain­
ing concessions ,  stabilize global inequity? 
That is a serious question and one powerfully 
argued (with himself as well as the reader) by 
Dr A. K. Sen Gupta: ‘Is it possible to remove 
gross inequities by sharing the incremental 
benefits on the margin?' even though ‘It is
much safer and probably more practical,  to 
adopt programmes based on mutual interest 
and sharing of  benefits .'  ’
A P rogram m e fo r  Survival in action would 
not make the North poorer or  absolutely w eak ­
e r— its t ransfers of  power and of  finance do 
not go that far. They would make the South 
less poor and stronger and create  a growing 
self-interest reason for the North  not to seek to 
reverse that process.  They could allow the 
South to build up collective p o w e r— whose 
absence Sen Gupta  notes, as did President 
Nyerere  in his Keynote  Address  to the 77 at 
Arusha. In any future confrontations or  nego­
tiations, they could then hold to a firmer and 
more durable line.
A P rogram m e fo r  Surviva l shares  the weak­
nesses and strengths o f  industrial relations and 
of  social dem ocracy .  There  are immediate 
benefits for very real human beings, there  are 
areas open to future advance. If a violent revo­
lution is needed, they may postpone  it or 
m ay — by illuminating the limits of  non-violent 
change— crea te  the conditions which make 
revolution practicable.
There  is a case that global negotiations can­
not produce st ructural change without prior 
violent confrontation  and that the ‘N1EO- 
m anqué ’ of  ICID1 would in fact perpetuate  
centre  exploitation of  the periphery and the 
existence of  southern  regimes willing to be 
partners in injustice. If that case is correc t,  
continued negotiations are objectively  a means 
to perpetuating exploitation and exclusion, re­
pression and exclusion. But unless that case is 
accepted , the cost  in lives of  trying to act on it 
is made c lear and a plausible scenario for suc­
cessful action is outlined, then negotiation 
(including confrontation to force serious nego­
tiation) remains ‘the only game in to w n ’ and 
the Brandt Report the only exis ting ‘game 
plan'  on which North and South might agree.
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Not fare well but fare forward
The plausible short-term stances with respect 
to the ICID1 Report are open opposition, 
quizzical silence and full support.  To take up a 
'Y es ,  but ' position is. in practice, to oppose; 
with such friends, A Program m e fo r  Survival 
will be overcom e by its enem ies,  enemies 
mobilizing around  the banner  emblazoned 
‘What We Have We Hold' (as p reviewed at the 
1980 New Delhi U N ID O  Conference).
To argue for fu l l  interim support  is not to 
assert that the P rogram m e  is perfect.  If it is to 
be improved, it must first be adopted . Then it 
will be necessary  to negotiate on how to oper­
ate the em ergency  priority m easures and how 
to articulate  and fill in the longer-term guide­
lines. That is the point at which modifications 
and additions can strengthen ra the r  than de­
stroy.
Alternatively,  if the struggle for the Prog­
ram m e  is lost, then is the time to begin prog­
ramming for neo-autarchist  Collective Self- 
reliance to meet the New Protectionism, for 
selective confrontation  to prove the dam ­
age-inflicting capacity  of Third W orld groups,
and  to  use  b lo c k in g  tac t ic s  in b o d ie s  o f  in te res t  
to  the  N o r th .  T o  d a b b le  in th e m  while  s t r u g ­
gling fo r  a se r io u s  d ia logue  is likely to  p lay  into 
the  h a n d s  o f  th o se  w h o  w a n t  no  chan g e .
If one accep ts  the Com miss ion’s assessment 
as basically valid (even if at points superficial) 
and its proposals as in the right direction (even 
if not fully adequate) then one should also ac­
cept its warning:
The search for solutions is not an act of  benev­
olence but a condition of mutual survival. We be­
lieve it is dramatically urgent today to start taking 
concrete steps.
Notes
1. The Rothko Chapel volume. Toward a New 
Strategy fo r  Development", 1979— especially essays 
by Strecteri, Cardoso, Minhas, Warren, Islam, 
Cooper and G reen— captures the 1976-77 debates 
on. and perceptions of, the previous period as they 
existed and were seen at that time.
2. See 'I .essons for the 1980s’, IDS Bulletin, 11-1, 
January 1980, especially editorial and pieces by S. 
Griffith-Jones, A. Weston, R. H. Green.
3. See Guardian 'Third World Review’, March 
18th, 1980.
